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Sir Martin Nourse* 
 
At the beginning of the 21st century an audience consisting mainly of lawyers 
will not need to be persuaded that the law has a contribution to make to literature 
or, at any rate, that it has a literature of its own. A hundred years ago it might 
have been different. The Oxford Book of English Prose, published in 1925, 
contained extracts from only three reported judgments. By a coincidence, it was 
in the Yale Review of the same year that Benjamin Cardozo’s Law and 
Literature first appeared, since when the opinion has been growing, certainly 
amongst lawyers, that there must be something in it. 
For myself, the defining moment was the publication in 1965 of Louis Blom-
Cooper’s The Literature of the Law.1 More that thirty-five years later, in his 
Margaret Howard Memorial Lecture entitled Judges among the Literati at Oxford 
in 2001 Sir Louis confessed to being unashamedly an anthologist of legal 
writings. If an element of self-deprecation is here to be detected, I would 
altogether reject it. To be in the company of such as Palgrave and Wavell is a 
cause for pride, especially where the sources are so diverse and largely 
unavailable to the average reader. I read every word of The Literature of the Law, 
almost at one sitting. Lord Birkett’s forward is itself a work of literature, 
reminding us that it is not only judges who have contributed, but great advocates 
like John Somers and Thomas Erskine. Here is what Macaulay said of Somers, 
later Lord Chancellor under William III, as junior counsel for the Seven Bishops 
in 1688, the greatest constitutional trial in our history:  
 
“Somers rose last. He spoke little more than five minutes; but every 
word was full of weighty matter; and when he sate down his 
reputation as an orator and a constitutional lawyer was established.” 
 
But just as the art of the great conversationalists survives only through the 
pens of their contemporaries, and then only if they have a Boswell to record 
them, so advocacy survives on in the record of the reporter. While advocacy so 
recorded may itself be literature, the record lacks the voice, the gesture and 
deportment which contributed to its greatness. Not so the report of a judgment 
which, though its delivery may often have impressed and persuaded, is primarily 
* Former Lord Justice of Appeal, former Vice-President, Court of Appeal (Civil 
Division), Acting Master of the Rolls, 2000. 
1 (New York: Macmillan, 1965).  
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intended to be read. For this reason, when we refer to the literature of the law, we 
think mainly of those judgments which, by reason of their structure, style and 
language, can justly be regarded as literary compositions. 
The notion that judgments ought to be of literary value was regularly 
articulated by Lord Campbell in his Lives of the Lord Chancellors2 published in 
the 1840’s. In assessing their judicial qualities, at any rate of those who held 
office from the 17th century onwards, he invariably commented on their literary 
gifts or lack of them. His greatest scorn was reserved for Lord Eldon. While 
Campbell did not hesitate to place him, as a judge, above all the judges of his 
own time, acknowledging that “for law he really had a natural genius, which was 
improved by long, sever, and unwearied discipline”, he said of his neglect of 
literature: 
 
“As a misfortune to Lord Eldon’s judicial reputation, I must 
likewise point out his utter relinquishment of literature, from the 
time when he began to study the law….  I do not now speak of 
his loss of that caste to which the Somersets, the Cowpers and 
the Talbots, the companions of Swift, Addison and Pope, had 
belonged – not to his neglect of fame – but the deprivation of 
taste which he displayed. Having forgotten his modicum of 
classical lore, and remaining wholly unacquainted with modern 
authors, he had no images in his mind, and no turns of 
phraseology, beyond what he picked up for perusing deeds and 
equity reports. In his latter days he could neither speak nor write 
grammatically – in so much that people would not believe he had 
gained a prize at Oxford for English composition; and he was 
actually compared to the roué Duke of Orleans, who said of 
spelling ‘we quarrelled at the outset of life, and never made up 
our differences’. This vandalism impaired not only the grace but 
the efficiency of his high judicial qualities, and not only deprived 
him of the benefit of knowing something of public opinion and 
of the progress of improvement, but really hindered him from 
arranging and expressing his thoughts so as to do justice to the 
right conclusions at which he had arrived. The celebrity of Lord 
Mansfield and Lord Stowell, as judges, is in no small degree 
owing to their having continued to refresh and to embellish their 
professional labours by perusing the immortal productions of 
poets, historians and moralists.” 
 
2 (London: John Murray, 1868). 
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This effusion notwithstanding, it is reassuring to record that later in his life of 
Lord Eldon, Lord Campbell said: “it is much better, if they cannot unite, that a 
judge should have law without literature, than literature without law.”  
Since Lord Campbell wrote there has been a steady stream of English-speaking 
judges, though a minority of judges as a whole, who have embellished their 
judgments with a distinctive and attractive style, not usually ornate, that entitles 
them to rank as literature. In order to show that Lord Denning was not the only 
star in the literary firmament of his time, I will mention another name from the 
second half of the 20th Century, whose inclusion in that number would not be 
denied. I speak of Lord Justice Harman. He was five years older that Lord 
Denning, a classical and not a mathematical scholar, an equity rather than a 
common lawyer. He sat in the Court of Appeal throughout the 1960’s. 
In 1957 Mr Justice Harman had to construe the will of George Bernard Shaw. 
The opening of his judgment was immediately recognised as a classic of its kind. 
I do not apologise for reading it again. Those of you who know it will certainly 
enjoy hearing it again. Those of you who do not will certainly enjoy hearing it for 
the first time: 
 
“All his long life Bernard Shaw was and indefatigable reformer. 
He was already well known when the present century dawned, as 
a novelist, critic, pamphleteer, playwright and during the ensuing 
half-century he continued to act as a kind of itching powder to 
the British public, to the English-speaking peoples, and, indeed 
to an even wider audience, castigating their follies, their foibles 
and their fallacies, and bombarding them with a combination of 
paradox and wit that earned him in the course of years the status 
of an oracle: the Shavian oracle; and the rare distinction of 
adding a word to the language. Many of his projects he lived to 
see gain acceptance and carried into effect and become normal. It 
was natural that he should be interested in English orthography 
and pronunciation. These are obvious targets for the reformer. It 
is as difficult for the native to defend the one as it is for the 
foreigner to compass the other. The evidence shows that Shaw 
had for many years been interested in the subject. Perhaps his 
best known excursion in this field is Pygmalion, in which the 
protagonist is a professor of phonetics: this was produced as a 
play in 1914 and has held the stage ever since and invaded the 
world of the film.  It is, indeed, a curious reflection that this 
same work, tagged with versicles which I suppose Shaw would 
have detested, and tricked out with music he would have 
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eschewed (see the preface to The Admirable Bashville),3 is now 
charming huge audiences on the other side of the Atlantic and 
has given birth to the present proceedings. I am told that the 
receipts from this source have enabled the executor to get on 
terms with the existing death duties payable on the estate, thus 
bringing the interpretation of the will into the realm of practical 
politics.The testator, whatever his other qualifications, was the 
master of a pellucid style, and the reader embarks on his will 
confident of finding no difficulty in understanding the objects 
which the testator had in mind. This document, moreover, was 
evidently originally the work of a skilled equity draftsman. As 
such I doubt not it was easily to be understood if not of the 
vulgar at any rate by the initiate. Unfortunately the will bears 
ample internal evidence of being in part the testator’s own work. 
The two styles, as ever, make an unfortunate mixture. It is 
always a marriage of incompatibles: the delicate testamentary 
machinery devised by the conveyancer can but suffer when 
subjected to the cacoethes scribendi of the author, even though 
the latter’s language, if stood alone, might be a literary 
masterpiece.This will is a long and complicated document made 
on June 12, 1950, when the testator was already ninety-four 
years old, though it is fair to say that it is rather youthful 
exuberance that the circumspection of old age that mars its 
symmetry.” 
 
Sir Louis Blom-Cooper has described Lord Justice Harman as the exponent 
of the pithy and elegant extempore judgment. As an example and a link between 
him and Lord Denning, I read an extract from another of Lord Justice Harman’s 
judgments included in Sir Louis’ anthology, Campbell Discount Ltd v Bridge,4 
though I suspect that this may have been what is know in the Court of Appeal as 
and overnight judgment:  
 
“I am of the same opinion and though I should like to emulate 
the laconic terms of the judgment of the county court judge 
which was expressed in two words, I feel constrained to add a 
word or two because of the uneasy feeling I have that the 
position of the law as it stands is not satisfactory…The solution 
may be that the minority view in Cooden Engineering was in 
fact the right one. I do not think anyhow that the discrepancy can 
3 (Murrieta, California: Classic Books, 2001). 
4 [1961] 1 QB 445. 
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be healed by some rather loose conception of what are called 
equitable principles. Equitable principles are, I think, perhaps 
rather too often bandied about in common law courts as though 
the Chancellor still had only the length of his own foot to 
measure when coming to a conclusion. Since the time of Lord 
Eldon the system of equity for good or evil has been a very 
precise one and equitable jurisdiction is exercised only on well-
known principles. There are some who would have it otherwise, 
and I think Lord Denning is one of them. He, it will be 
remembered, invented an equity call the equity of the deserted 
wife. That distressful female’s condition has really not been 
improved at all now that this so-called equity has been 
analysed.”  
 
That I believe is how the judgment was delivered, though if you look in the 
Law Reports, you will find that the references to Lord Denning and the deserted 
wife’s equity have been omitted on revision. 
Turning to Lord Denning himself, it is necessary to remind ourselves of the 
bare bones of his judicial career. He was appointed a judge of the Probate 
Divorce and Admiralty Division in 1944, being transferred to the Kings Bench 
Division in October 1945. During his time there he was the judge nominated to 
hear appeals from pensions appeal tribunals. In October 1948 he became a lord 
justice of appeal, an office he held until April 1957, when he was appointed a 
lord of appeal in ordinary. Five years later, in April 1962, he returned to the 
Court of Appeal as Master of the Rolls, an office which he held until July 1982. 
In judging Lord Denning’s contribution to the literature of the law, it is 
necessary to distinguish between the periods 1944 to 1962 and 1962 to 1982. By 
and large there is a noticeable contrast between the style of his judgments in the 
first period, especially when he was a lord justice, and the style of his judgments 
in the second, when he was Master of the Rolls. In Lord Denning, the Man and 
his Times, a contribution by the late Professor Heuston to Lord Denning: the 
Judge and the Law,5 it is said of the first period:  
 
“If the reader of the law reports had not already realised it, there 
were now many signs of a powerful new mind at work. In many 
ways the judgments of the fifties are classic Denning; there is 
still enough respect for the precedent, for the analysis of the 
cases to be full and careful, and the style, clear and vivid, is not 
yet marred by the self-conscious tricks of the Seventies. 
Everyone who remembers those days will have his own 
5 J L Jowell and J P W B MacAuslan (London: Sweet and Maxwell, 1984). 
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recollections of how he reacted to the masterly line of 
judgments.” 
 
Of the second period Professor Heuston said: 
 
“Denning’s style had always been unusual; by the mid-seventies 
it was not quite so admired as it had been. The structure of the 
judgment was as clear and sound as ever, and often praised by 
his fellow judges, but a certain striving after effect has become 
noticeable in the style rather than in the arrangement. There were 
few or no subordinate clauses, and sometimes no verb in the 
sentences. So the style was lacking in the cadences. Also in the 
terse vivid opening sentence, to which he himself attached so 
much importance for gripping the reader’s attention, often 
seemed inappropriate, especially in cases of severe personal 
injuries. Parodies began to appear – sometimes quite amusing.” 
 
In a footnote reference is made to Grenouille v National Union of Seamen 
(1979), which you will find fully reported in the Family Story.6
Other, more recent, commentators have offered similar criticisms of Lord 
Denning’s later style. In his Margaret Howard Memorial Lecture Sir Louis Blom-
Cooper said, in a section dealing with the colloquial style of the judgment:  
 
“No one better exemplifies this category than Lord Denning 
whose idiosyncratic style was in fact unique. His penchant for 
beginning every (well, nearly every) judgment with a simple 
story had the commendable virtue of appealing to a wide 
audience, but it tended to grate on the professional ear, at least 
when delivered orally in court, and even later in written form. 
This form of judgment was meretricious, in the sense of being 
showily but falsely attractive.” 
 
In The Form and Language of Judicial Opinions, a lecture delivered to the 
annual conference of the Society of Public Teachers of Law at Glasgow 
University in 2001, Lord Roger of Earlsferry said: 
 
“Lord Denning is, of course, a subject in himself but not one to 
be embarked upon here. I shall only say that the famous 
openings, though great fun, do not, in my view, really work. 
They strike me as faux naïf – something like the literary 
6 (London: Hamlyn, 1982). 
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equivalent of the primitive paintings of Grandma Moses. But 
Grandma Moses was not an educated woman, whereas Lord 
Denning was a clever and highly educated man. No one ever 
spoke as Lord Denning wrote in these passages and no one ever 
wrote in that way except in fairy stories and tales for children. 
The style is so contrived that it alerts the reader to the fact that 
something is afoot” 
 
In a footnote Lord Rodger says that the famous openings are and example of 
what linguistic scholars call “foregrounding”. 
I return to the first period. The earliest judgment in which a foretaste of the 
later style has been detected is James v Minister of Pensions,7 an appeal from a 
decision of a pensions appeal tribunal, where Mr Justice Denning said: 
 
“Gunner James joined the army on July 24, 1941, at the age of 
thirty-two. In January 1943, he had a swelling on the right side 
of his neck which gradually spread. He was sent to hospital, 
when a diagnosis of Hodgkin’s disease was made. In April 1943 
he was discharged on account of it. He claimed a pension. It was 
rejected by the Minister. In February 1946 he died on account of 
the disease. His widow claimed a pension. Her claim was also 
rejected by the Minister. She appealed to a tribunal who, on 
September 18, 1946, rejected her appeal. She did not apply to the 
tribunal for leave to appeal within the six weeks allowed by the 
rules of the tribunal. On November 21, 1946, the case of 
Donovan v Minister of Pensions, [(1946), not reported], which 
was also a case of Hodgkin’s disease, was decided in favour of 
the widow. When knowledge of this decision came to Mrs 
James’s advisers they sought from the tribunal leave to appeal 
out of time. The tribunal itself and the President of the Pensions 
Appeal Tribunals refused the application, refusing to extend the 
time or to grant leave. The widow now applies for leave to 
appeal.” 
 
It will not surprise you to hear that she got it. In the Family Story Lord 
Denning says that the effect of this decision was magical; many men obtained 
pensions which had previously been refused. He described the pensions appeals 
as perhaps the most rewarding series of cases in his career, pointing out, it could 
be said with more than satisfaction, that he was the sole judge – and what was 
7 [1947] KB 876.  
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more, a judge from whose decision there was no appeal to the Court of Appeal or 
anyone else. 
For knowledge of the judgment in James v Minister of Pensions and for 
much else which follows I am indebted to an article entitled It all started with 
Gunner James by Cameron Harvey of the University of Manitoba, first published 
in 1983 Gazette of the Law Society of Upper Canada and reprinted in the 
Denning Law Journal for 1986. The author said that this judgment, though not 
entirely in the classic Denning style, was the seminal judgment. For myself, I 
would describe it as a classic example of the first period of Lord Denning’s 
judgments.  
The first judgment of Lord Justice Denning to be found in the Law Reports is 
Bishopsgate Motor Finance Company Ltd v Transport Brakes Ltd,8 a case about 
the sale of goods in market overt. He started his judgment thus: 
 
“I agree. In the development of our law, two principles have 
striven for mastery. The first is for the protection of property: no 
one can give a better title than he himself possesses. The second 
is for the protection of commercial transactions: the person who 
takes in good faith and for value without notice should get a 
good title. The first principle has held sway for a long time, but it 
has been modified by the common law itself and by statute so as 
to meet the needs of our own times. The modification here in 
question is one conferred by the common law itself.” 
 
What Professor Heuston described as the “masterly line of judgments” had 
begun. When you get to the second volume of the King’s Bench reports for 1949 
you find them coming one after another. They include Seaford Court Estates Ltd 
v Asher,9 one of Lord Denning’s earliest decisions on the construction of statutes. 
He said: 
 
“Whenever a statute comes up for consideration it must be 
remembered that it is not within human powers to foresee the 
manifold sets of facts which may arise, and, even if it were, it is 
not possible for them in terms free from all ambiguity. The 
English language is not an instrument of mathematical precision. 
Our literature would be much the poorer if it were. This is where 
the draftsmen of Acts of Parliament have often been unfairly 
criticised. A judge, believing himself to be fettered by the 
supposed rule that he mist look to the language and nothing else, 
8 [1949] 1 KB 322. 
9 [1949] 2 KB 481. 
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laments that the draftsmen have not provided for this or that, or 
have been guilty of some or other ambiguity. It would certainly 
save the judges trouble if Acts of Parliament were drafted with 
divine prescience and perfect clarity. In the absence of it, when a 
defect appears a judge cannot simply fold his hands and blame 
the draftsmen. He must set to work on the constructive task of 
finding the intention of Parliament, and he must do this not only 
from the language of the statute, but also from a consideration of 
the social conditions which gives rise to it, and of the mischief 
which is was passed to remedy, and then he must supplement the 
written word so as to give ‘force and life’ to the intention of the 
legislature….. Put into homely metaphor it is this: A judge 
should ask himself the question: If the makers of the Act had 
themselves come across this ruck in the texture of it, how would 
they have straightened it out? He must then do as they would 
have done. A judge must not alter the material of which it is 
woven, but he can and should iron out the creases.” 
 
Perhaps best of all from this volume and the very next decision reported is 
Smith and Snipes Farm Ltd v River Douglas Catchment Board,10 the earliest case 
in which Lord Denning propounded is view that a person may enforce an 
agreement respecting property made for his benefit, although he is not a party to 
it. His judgment begins thus: 
 
“There is in Lancashire a river called Eller Brook which is liable 
to overflow its banks and the flood the adjoining land. In 1938, 
in order to prevent the flooding, eleven owners of the land 
through which the river ran made an agreement with the local 
catchment board, whereby the board undertook to widen, deepen 
and make good the banks of the river, and thereafter to maintain 
them, and the landowners paid a contribution towards the cost. 
The Board did the work and practically completed it by 1940, 
but they did it so unskilfully that, in the opinion of experts, it 
was from the first doomed to failure. The landowners, of course, 
did not know this and set about cultivating the land. The low 
meadows, which had been rough marshland, were broken up and 
brought under the plough. Crops were sown and harvested. But 
the banks of the river were not strong enough to stand serious 
floods. In 1944 they burst. The breach on that occasion was soon 
closed, but the board’s engineer was unaware of the danger. He 
10 [1949] 2 KB 500.  
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reported to the board that ‘the bank is a bad one under any 
conditions’. In 1945 there was another burst near by, and he 
reported that ‘this bank is largely composed of sand. I propose to 
put a machine on to strengthen it as soon as one is available’. But 
apparently he did nothing, or at any rate nothing effective. The 
landowners and their tenants went on cultivating the land. They 
did not know that the banks were doomed failure. Then in 1946 
the worst happened.  Serious floods arose, the banks burst, the 
fields were flooded, and the crops ruined. This action is brought 
by a tenant of the fields against the board to recover the value of 
the crops he has lost. The present owner joins in the action, 
claiming his loss of rent, but the substantial claim is by the 
tenant company. On those facts it is my opinion that the board 
broke their contract. It was an implied term that they should do 
the work with reasonable care and skill so as to make the banks 
reasonably fit for the purpose of preventing flooding.” 
 
It is difficult not to think of that as a model of its kind. Not only does it tell 
you, in little more than a paragraph, what the case is all about and the judge’s 
view of it is. It does so in the clear and vivid style admired by Professor Heuston 
and with a countryman’s feeling for the land. The style is about as far from being 
staccato as it is possible to be. It is fluid, indeed mellifluous. I have always 
regarded it as judicial prose of the highest order. 
There is much to be said for the view that Lord Denning felt most at home in 
cases with a country setting. One of his first recorded dissents was in Wright v 
Callwood,11 a case where the county court judge had held that the defendant had 
been negligent in driving calves on to a road. The majority of the Court of 
Appeal disagreed. But Lord Justice Denning thought that the judge had been 
right. He said: 
 
“The plaintiff was riding her bicycle, quite carefully, along a 
road from Nantwich to Audlem. As she came opposite a gate 
leading to a farmyard, two calves rushed out, one of them 
knocked her off her bicycle, and she was injured. She brings this 
action against the farmer for damages. The calves had been in 
the field on the other side of the road, and the farmer had gone to 
fetch them by himself without the help of anyone else. He had 
driven them out of the field and along the public highway and 
into the drive leading towards the farmyard. As they were going 
along the drive, which is only fifty feet long, suddenly a motor 
11 [1950] 2 KB 515. 
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lorry in the farmyard started up. The two calves were frightened 
and dashed back down the drive with the farmer following them. 
Hence the accident. The question is whether the plaintiff can 
recover.” 
 
As the 1950’s went on, the style remained clear and vivid, subordinate 
clauses were note eschewed and every sentence had a verb. But it is possible to 
trace a development during those years from the mellifluous prose of Smith and 
Snipes Hall Farm towards the staccato style of the 1960’s and 1970’s. Thus in 
Deeble v Robinson:12  
 
“Mr Deeble has a milk round. He sells milk to people at the 
doors of their houses. He runs his business from a dairy building 
where he keeps his equipment, refrigerator, spare milk bottles, 
and so forth, and a stable where he keeps his horse and float. His 
round is seven streets adjoining the premises. He does not 
actually have a shop as ordinarily understood. His lease of these 
premises is coming to an end, and he wants to stay on there. This 
depends on whether the premises come within the definition of a 
‘shop’ in the Leasehold Property (Temporary Provisions) Act 
1951.” 
 
This, I am sure you will agree looks forward to Beswick v Beswick13 in 1966. 
Again, in Rands v McNeil:14
 
“A Yorkshire farmer had a dangerous bull. He knew it was 
dangerous because the bull on one occasion had chased one of 
his men in the yard. The farmer thereafter kept the bull inside a 
loose box all of the time. It was kept there untethered. On a later 
occasion the bull got the farmer himself against the wall of the 
box and the farmer then took his horns off. The bull was never 
let out of the box except when the box has to be cleaned out. 
Even the cows were taken into the box for service.” 
 
Then in Slater v Clay Cross Co Ltd:15
 
12 [1954] 1 QB 77. 
13 [1966] Ch 538. 
14 [1955] 1 QB 253. 
15 [1956] 2 QB 264. 
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“In Derbyshire there has been for well over a hundred years a 
railway line owned by the Clay Cross Co. We were told that 
George Stephenson himself made it. The company use it to carry 
limestone from their quarries at Crich down to Ambergate. It is a 
small gauge line, only 3 feet 3 inches wide, and is two and a half 
miles long. On that small line there are two tunnels. One of 
them, with which we are concerned, is only 8 or 9 feet high and 
it is just 66 yards long. On February 12, 1953, the plaintiff was 
walking through the tunnel when she suddenly realised that a 
train was coming up behind her. She got down on the ground to 
seek what safety she could but unfortunately the train ran over 
one of her legs…. She now claims damages against the Clay 
Cross Co., saying that it was their fault.” 
 
The early 1950’s were exciting times. Professor Heuston has rightly said that 
everyone who remembers them will have his own recollections of how he 
reacted. Permit me therefore a personal recollection. Between 1953 and 1955 I 
was reading law at Cambridge. By that time the dons were up in arms at many of 
Lord Denning’s judgments, especially his dissents. Not so the students. I 
remember us passing messages round at the back of the lectures saying such as: 
“Have you read in the Times today and seen the latest judgment of hero Denning, 
LJ?” One Friday evening in February 1955 he came down to address the Law 
Society. I have his letter of acceptance still. I remember taking him into the 
largest room in the Old Schools, packed out to the limits, almost literally to the 
extent of people hanging on the rafters. I opened proceedings by saying that to 
introduce Lord Justice Denning to an audience such as that was rather like going 
onto the balcony at St Peters, Rome and introducing the Pope. Of course it was 
an outstanding piece of nerve, which only a student could have perpetrated. But 
the audience seemed to love it and the speaker himself did not demur. 
Before turning to the second period, I must remind you of two passages from 
Lord Denning’s books in which he spoke about himself. First, from The 
Discipline of Law:16  
 
“At Oxford I studied Mathematics. No need for words there. The 
tools I used then were numbers, letters and symbols. They were 
lifeless things without meaning or sound – necessary tools of the 
scientist but not of the lawyer. But when I was called to the Bar, 
I had to become proficient with words. I did it by drawing on my 
reserves of English literature. These I had acquired at the 
Elizabethan Grammar School to which I went daily. I had read 
16 (London:  LexisNexis Butterworths, 1979). 
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much of Shakespeare and many of our poets and novelists while 
still at school. All my prizes from the age of 11 were for English. 
I have them still, bound in handsome leather, with the school 
crest and the date AD 1569. The titles in succession are the Great 
Authors, Macaulay, Carlyle and Milton. Reading these and 
others provided the essentials: a wide vocabulary of words, and 
understanding of the meaning attached to them by the masters of 
the language….. Next I had to practise continually. As a pianist 
practises the piano, so the lawyer should practise the use of 
words, both in writing and by word of mouth….. In chambers, if 
asked to advise, I took infinite pains in the writing of an opinion. 
I crossed out sentence after sentence. I wrote them again and 
again.” 
 
We can be certain that when he came to write his reserved judgments in later 
life Lord Denning still crossed out sentence after sentence and wrote them again 
an again. I was once told by his faithful court reporter, Miss Mavis Hill, that the 
transcripts of his extempore judgments came back to her heavily amended, so as 
to improve the style. Undoubtedly, many of his judgments were works of 
conscious artistry. In his later years the artistry sometimes appeared to be self-
conscious. 
Next, I read a well-known passage from the Family Story, where he describes 
“the usual kind” and then “my kind” of judgment: 
 
“I start my judgment, as it were, with a prologue – as the chorus 
does in one of Shakespeare’s plays – to introduce the story. Then 
I go on from act to act as Shakespeare does – each with its 
scenes – drawn from real life. But I do it by subdividing my 
judgment up into main headings (corresponding to the acts) and 
sub-paragraphs (corresponding to the scenes) – each with a 
caption – so as to catch the eye. I draw the characters as they 
truly are – using their real names – so that I never get them 
mixed up. Never plaintiff or defendant, or appellant or 
respondent. In telling the story, I set out the merits – I rely on 
them – I do not scorn them. Because the merits go to show where 
the justice lies. I use every argument that appears to me to be 
valid. I am not afraid of the rebuke, ‘That is mere prejudice’: for 
I know that only too often it is used only as a way of escape – 
from the merits. I avoid long sentences like the plague: because 
they lead to obscurity. It is no good if the hearer cannot follow 
them. I strive at all costs to be clear. Not ambiguous or 
prevaricating. I refer sometimes to previous authorities – I have 
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to do so – because I know that people are prone not to accept my 
views unless they have support from the books. But never at 
much length. Only a sentence or two. I avoid all reference to 
pleadings and orders – unless something turns on them. They are 
merely lawyer’s stuff. They are unintelligible to anyone else. I 
finish with a conclusion – an epilogue – again as the chorus does 
in Shakespeare. In it I gather the threads together and given the 
result.” 
 
This passage can be objected to on two grounds: first, the grandiose 
comparison with Shakespeare; second, the implication that “my kind” of 
judgment is the only kind that is any good. It is important to remember that it was 
written in 1981, when the author can only have been thinking of later judgments. 
Many of the most famous of these are referred to in It All Started with Gunner 
James, where Cameron Harvey speaks of the impressive array of “openers”, 
grouping them into nine categories (I will give and example of each): the 
intriguing opener (“It all started in a public house”); the historical opener 
(“Today we look back far in time to a town or village green.”); the fatal and 
deadly opener (“A man”s head got caught in a propeller. He was decapitated and 
killed.”); the “This is the case” opener (“This is the case of three smugglers”); the 
editorial opener (“Counsel for the vendor referred to this case as a comedy of 
errors. It is no comedy but a history of errors.”); the non sequitur opener (“Many 
years ago Sir Edward Coke had a case about six carpenters. Now we have a case 
about six car-hire drivers.”); the “This is an interesting case” opener (“This is a 
short but fortunately a very rare point”); the whimsical opener (“A gigantic ship 
was used for a gigantic fraud.”) the picturesque opener (“In summertime village 
cricket is the delight of everyone. Nearly every village has its own cricket field 
where the young men play and the old men watch.”) 
This brings me to Lord Denning’s old folks. I read from Cameron Harvey’s 
article: 
 
“There was old Herbert Bundy of Yew Tree Farm, Old Mr Baker 
of Dunsmore in Buckinghamshire, old Mrs Millward whose will 
was contested, old Mrs Annie Levenson who had one of the best 
pitches in the Petticoat Street Market in London, and old Mr 
Jones the scrap merchant. But his most memorable work sketch 
was none other than old Peter Beswick.” 
 
The earliest reference I have found to one of the old folks is not in a Denning 
judgment; it is to “old Caleb Diplock” in a lecture entitled “The Changing Civil 
Law” delivered in about 1953. He it was, you will remember, who directed his 
executors to apply the residue of his large estate for such charitable or benevolent 
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object of objects as they should in their absolute discretion select. Because he had 
used the word “or” instead of “and”, it was held by the Court of Appeal and the 
House of Lords, much to the disgust of Lord Denning, that the gift, not being 
exclusively charitable, was void for uncertainty and, later, that the charities who, 
in all innocence, had received distributions from the estate must repay them for 
the benefit of the next-of-kin. 
It is not possible within the compass of a piece such as this to quote more 
fully from the later judgments. On the whole they are better known than the 
earlier ones and many of you will have your own favourites. The narrative 
introduction to Broome v Cassell17 is of the highest quality. Not is it possible to 
quote further from the books, the lectures and the Profumo Report of 1963, in 
which Lord Denning took a justifiable pride. I will only say that The Family 
Story contains passages of deep poignancy telling of the deaths of his brothers 
Jack and Gordon during the Great War and his first wife, Mary, in 1941. Had he 
written often thus, it would have been vain to blame, and useless to praise him. 
In literary criticism the contributions of those who have themselves been 
creative writers (Coleridge and Eliot are names that spring to mind) have been of 
special value, not just for their intuitive judgments of others but as an insight into 
their own compositions. I want to end with a brief consideration of Lord 
Denning’s own literary tastes, so far as we can gather from the man and what he 
has left behind. In that way we may be able to make a surer assessment of his 
contribution to the literature of the law. 
As we have heard, he read much of Shakespeare and many of our poets and 
novelist whilst still at school. It seem likely that his tastes were settled by the 
time he went off to the Great War, at any rate by the time he left Oxford. The 
Bible and Shakespeare apart, he has told us of Macaulay, Carlyle and Milton. 
Much of the rest must be guesswork, both from the authors he quotes or refers to 
and those he does not. Chaucer he certainly admired, Bacon and Bunyan. He 
does not mention Spenser or any of the Elizabethan dramatists other than 
Shakespeare, nor Donne (as a poet) or any of the metaphysical poets, nor Marvell 
or Dryden, nor in the next century, Pope or Cowper. In The Family Story he says, 
surprisingly, that to him Johnsons’s prose, poetry and philosophy are turgid and 
unreadable. Boswell, however, is a favourite. Gray he mentions, but not 
Goldsmith. He does not mention any of the eighteenth century novelists, though I 
suspect that, like Lord Birkett, he would have admired their prose, Sterne 
particularly. 
When we get to the next century, Wordsworth is a favourite among the 
Romantic poets, not Byron or Shelley, I would think, perhaps not even Keats or 
Coleridge. Dickens seems to have been his favourite Victorian novelist and 
Tennyson and Browning his favourite poets. I doubt he would have had any time 
17 [1971] 2 QB 354. 
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for Swinburne. Among the minors, he liked Blunt, Clough and Christina Rossetti 
and, on a lighter note, WS Gilbert and Lewis Carroll. Moving into the twentieth 
century Kipling, Binyon, Blundon and Brooke were favourites. No doubt Julian 
Grenfell would have been too, though not, it seems, Owen or Sassoon. He does 
not mention Masefield. 
Standing back at this point, we could say that Lord Denning’s tastes in 
literature were those of a conventional, educated Englishman born at the end of 
the nineteenth century. On Desert Island Discs he chose Palgrave’s Golden 
Treasury as the book to take with him. Knowing what we do of his character and 
high morality, we can understand that he would not have felt comfortable with 
the poetry of Byron Shelley, or Swinburne, of each of whom, as an individual, he 
probably disapproved. But I think it goes further than that. Knowing of his 
affection for Milton and Tennyson, in whose verse the senses of sight and 
hearing are so pronounced, though not for the less intellectual senses of smell, 
taste and touch, and assuming, as I have, that he was not move by poets such as 
Keats, I think we would have to say that his sensibility, though by no means 
defective, was limited. It must be significant that in the Family Story he said that 
he had no ear for classical music.  
It must also be said that he never caught up with what were then called the 
modernist poets, whose reputations were established before he was forty: Eliot, 
Auden, Spender, Day Lewis, MacNeice. Perhaps that was an opportunity missed. 
Take Hinz v Berry18 where there is one of his most famous openers: “It happened 
on April 19, 1964. It was bluebell time in Kent.” Suppose he had added; “April is 
the cruellest month.”  True, we would have been mightily surprised, but gratified 
as well. Finally, it must be said that the whole of European literature appears to 
have been to him a closed book. 
It is a matter of little import that we should have to conclude that Lord 
Denning’s tastes in literature were conventional, even ordinary. A cultivated, far 
less a refined taste, has never been an essential of literary composition. More 
important are imagination and originality. These he certainly had. In a letter to 
his brother Jack at the front in 1916 he promised to send him one of his lately 
composed poems. I am not aware that he left any verse behind him. It is difficult 
to think of him as a poet. But he did have a poetico-dramatic imagination which 
conjured the settings for his judgments and vivified the players as he, not always 
others, saw them. As we who remember him so well pass on, I think the later 
judgments will cease to grate even on the professional ear and the style of fairy 
stories and tales for children will enlarge their appeal to a more general 
readership. The superb prose of the earlier judgments, of which I have sought to 
remind you, must always be admired. 
18 [1970] 2 QB 40. 
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If the great end of literary endeavour is to excite the intellect and enthuse the 
heart, that test is passed. Remember that the judgment, though it can be an art 
form, will always be a minor form, such is the straight-jacket in which it is 
written. Even if the judgments of Lord Denning the fancy does not roam at will. 
Perhaps his greatest literary achievement is sometimes to charm his readers into 
thinking it does. 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
